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1. Introduction 
 It is often claimed that the Japanese are big savers and that they save a lot 
because it is part of their national character to do so and/or because of the influence of 
Confucian teachings, which regard frugality as a virtue.  In this paper, I examine (1) 
whether or not the Japanese really do save a lot and whether or not they have always 
saved a lot, (2) why the Japanese save a lot (if indeed they do), and (3) whether or not 
we can expect the Japanese to continue saving a lot in the future as well. 
 The organization of the paper is as follows:  In section 2, I present data on 
trends over time in Japan’s household saving rate and on household saving rates in 
international perspective; in section 3, I consider the reasons for Japan’s high household 
saving rate; in section 4, I consider the reasons for the recent decline in Japan’s 
household saving rate; in section 5, I project future trends in Japan’s household saving 
rate; in section 6, I consider the implications of my findings; and section 7 is a brief 
concluding section. 
 To preview my main findings, I find, first, that Japan’s high household saving 
rate was a temporary phenomenon and that it was high in both absolute and relative 
terms during the 1955-95 period (especially during the 1960s and 1970s) but that it was 
not unusually high during the prewar and early postwar periods or after 1995; second, 
that Japan’s temporarily high household saving rate was due not to culture but to 
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temporary economic, demographic, and institutional factors such as the high growth rate 
of income, the low level of household wealth holdings, the unavailability of consumer 
credit, the young age structure of the population, the bonus system of compensation, tax 
breaks for saving, the low level of public pension benefits, and saving promotion 
activities; third, that the decline in Japan’s household saving rate since the mid-1970s is 
due to the weakening of these factors and that Japan’s household saving rate can be 
expected to decline even further as these factors become even less applicable and that 
the rapid aging of Japan’s population has played the most important role; and fourth, 
that there is nothing to worry about even if Japan’s household saving rate falls to zero or 
even negative levels because the other sectors of the economy will at least partly take up 
the slack, because investment can also be expected to decline, and because Japan always 
has the option of borrowing from abroad. 
   
2. Do (Did) the Japanese Really Save a Lot? 
In this section, I present data on trends over time in Japan’s household saving 
rates and on household saving rates in international perspective in order to shed light on 
whether Japan’s household saving rate is high in absolute and/or relative terms.  I 
present data on net saving (saving net of depreciation on fixed capital) because it is net 
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saving that leads to an increase in wealth or assets and that is thus the more meaningful 
concept.   
  
2.1. Trends over Time in Japan’s Household Saving Rate   
I look first at trends over the past century in Japan’s household saving rate.  
As I have shown in Horioka (1993a), Japan’s household saving rate was volatile during 
the prewar, wartime, and early postwar periods.  It was low, sometimes even negative, 
during about half of the years in this period (1907-15, 1921-30, and 1946-49) but was 
high and generally in the double digits during the other years (1906, 1916-20, 1931-44, 
and 1950-54).  In fact, it exceeded 30 or even 40 percent at the height of World War II 
(1941-44), but during the war years, goods were scarce or rationed and the state 
encouraged and often forced people to save.  If we exclude the war years (1937-45), 
Japan’s household saving rate was low, on average, during both the prewar and early 
postwar periods, averaging only 4.3 percent during the prewar period (1906-1936) 
according to the Long-Term Economic Statistics and only 5.6 percent during the early 
postwar period (1945-54) according to the former System of National Accounts 
(hereafter SNA).1   
Turning to the post-1955 period, a continuous time series is unfortunately not 
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available for the entire post-1955 period.  The Japanese government switched from the 
1968 United Nations SNA to the 1993 United Nations SNA in 2000, and thus data based 
on the 1968 SNA are available only for the 1955-1998 period whereas data based on the 
1993 SNA are available only since 1980.2  Two further complications are that the 1995 
benchmark revision was implemented at the same time as the conversion to the 1993 
SNA and that the 2000 benchmark revision was implemented in 2005.  As a result, 
there are three different data series for the 1955-2004 period, with data based on the 
1968 SNA (1990 benchmark revision) being available only for the 1955-1998 period, 
data based on the 1993 SNA (1995 benchmark revision) being available only for the 
1980-2003 period, and data based on the 1993 SNA (2000 benchmark revision) being 
available only for the 1996-2004 period.   
In the case of the 1993 SNA, I present data on the adjusted household saving 
rate because it includes social transfers in kind (i.e., social benefits in kind and transfers 
of individual non-market goods and services from the government and from private 
non-profit institutions serving households) in both the numerator and the denominator 
and hence is the correct theoretical concept and because it is consistent with the 
household saving rate based on the 1968 SNA. 
Figure 1 and Table A-1 show data on all three series for the 1955-2004 period, 
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and as can be seen from this figure and table, Japan’s household saving rate showed a 
steady upward trend from the mid-1950s until the mid-1970s, increasing from 11.9 
percent in 1955 to a phenomenal level of 23.2 percent in 1974 and 1976, but has shown 
a downward trend since then, falling to the 2 to 3 percent level in recent years. 
(Figure 1 about here)   
If we give precedence to data based on the 1993 SNA whenever possible, 
Japan’s household saving rate exceeded 20 percent only during the six-year period from 
1973 until 1978, exceeded 15 percent only during the 21-year period from 1961 until 
1981, and exceeded 10 percent only during the 41-year period from 1955 until 1995.  
To sum up, Japan’s household saving rate was not always high.  It was high 
during much of the postwar period (especially during the 1960s and 1970s), but it was 
not necessarily high during the prewar and early postwar periods and has by no means 
been high in recent years.     
  
2.2. International Comparison of Household Saving Rates 
I turn now to an international comparison of household saving rates.  Horioka 
(1989, Table 1) shows data on household saving rates for the 1975-84 period for the 
sixteen Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member 
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countries for which data are available, while Table 1 shows data on household saving 
rates for the 1985-2005 period for the 23 OECD member countries for which data are 
available.  Data are available only on gross household saving rates for five of these 
countries, but since net household saving rates are, on average, about 70 percent of 
gross household saving rates, the figures on the gross household saving rate were 
converted to a net basis using this conversion factor in the case of the five countries for 
which only gross data are available. 
(Table 1 about here) 
As can be seen from Horioka (1989, Table 1) and Table 1, Japan’s household 
saving rate was one of the highest among the OECD member countries during the 
1975-85 period.  It ranked first in 1975, was second only to Italy in 1980 and 1985, 
and was 1.79, 1.61, and 1.81 times the OECD average in 1975, 1980, and 1985, 
respectively.  However, Japan’s rank among the OECD member countries as well as 
the ratio of her household saving rate to the OECD average both fell steadily during the 
subsequent twenty years.  For example, by 1990, Japan had fallen to fourth place (tie)  
and her household saving rate had fallen to 1.43 times the OECD average.  By 1995, 
Japan had fallen further to seventh place, and her household saving rate had fallen 
further to 1.25 times the OECD average.  By 2000, Japan had fallen further to tenth 
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place although her household saving rate rose slightly to 1.32 times the OECD average.  
Finally, by 2005, Japan had fallen further to 17th place and her household saving rate 
had fallen to only 43 percent of the OECD average.   
 Thus, Japan’s household saving rate was formerly high not only in absolute 
terms but also relative to the other developed countries and was at one point the highest 
in the developed world, but it has since fallen not only in absolute terms but also 
relative to the other developed countries and is no longer high by any standard. 
 What is especially striking is that Japan’s relative ranking fell sharply during 
the 1985-2005 period even though 17 of the 23 OECD member countries for which data 
are available as well as the OECD average showed downward trends during the same 
period (with the OECD average falling to only 62 percent of its 1985 level by 2005). 
This is because Japan’s household saving rate declined even more sharply than that of 
the other OECD member countries. 
 Incidentally, what OECD member countries have shown the highest household 
saving rates?  Japan occupied the number one position in 1975, Italy occupied the 
number one position in 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995, and Hungary occupied the number 
one position in 2000 and 2005.  Moreover, these countries have ranked relatively high 
in other years as well (except for Japan in 2005).  France, Germany, South Korea, and 
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Switzerland have also shown relatively high household saving rates (except for South 
Korea in 2005).  By contrast, the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
and Sweden), the Czech Republic, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States have shown relatively low household saving rates (except for Norway in 2005).  
Thus, the rank ordering of the OECD member countries has been relatively stable over 
time. 
 An exploration of the reasons for these inter-country differences in household 
saving rates is beyond the scope of this paper, but many of the countries with low 
household saving rates have generous social insurance systems, and thus households in 
these countries may not feel the need to save for retirement and/or for precautionary 
purposes.  
 Note, however, that these inter-country differences in household saving rates 
have not necessarily been stable over time.  For example, the relative positions of 
Australia and Canada fell by as much as that of Japan during the 1985-2005 period 
(from seventh place to 22nd place and from third place to 18th place, respectively), and 
Finland, South Korea, New Zealand, and the United States also showed sharp declines 
in their relative positions.  By contrast, Norway showed a sharp increase in its relative 
position (from 17th place in 1985 to second place in 2005), and France, Ireland, and 
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Sweden also showed substantial increases.  An interesting case is that of the 
Netherlands, whose rank increased sharply from 13th place in 1985 to third place in 
1990 before falling back down to 13th place in 2005. 
 The fact that inter-country differences in household saving rates are relatively 
stable but sometimes show sharp variations over time suggests that these differences are 
due partly to long-term factors and partly to short-term factors.  
To sum up, Japan’s household saving rate was high in both absolute and 
relative terms during the 1955-95 period (especially during the 1960s and the 1970s) but 
has declined in both absolute and relative terms since the mid-1970s and is no longer 
high by any standard. 
 
3. Why Did the Japanese Save So Much?   
In the previous section, we found that the Japanese saved a lot during the 
1955-95 period (especially during the 1960s and 1970s) but not before or after.  In this 
section, we consider the reasons why the Japanese saved so much during this period.  
 
3.1. The Impact of Culture 
One oft-heard hypothesis is that Japan’s household saving rate has been high 
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for cultural and/or religious reasons.  One variant of this hypothesis is that it is part of 
the national character of the Japanese to save a lot, and another variant is that the 
Japanese save a lot because of the influence of Confucian teachings, which regard 
frugality as a virtue.  In this subsection, I consider how much explanatory power this 
hypothesis has. 
First, if Japan’s household saving rate was high for cultural reasons, it should 
always have been high because culture is presumably relatively invariant over time.  
As we saw in section 2, however, Japan’s household saving rate was high primarily 
during the 1955-95 period (especially during the 1960s and 1970s) and was not 
unusually high during the prewar and early postwar periods or after 1995. 
Second, since culture presumably weakens over time as better transportation 
and communication systems facilitate the influx of foreign influences, we would expect 
Japan’s household saving rate to show a downward trend over time if culture is an 
important determinant thereof.  However, as we saw in section 2, Japan’s household 
saving rate did not show any clear trend during the prewar period and showed a clear 
upward trend during the early postwar period (until the mid-1970s) although it has 
shown a downward trend since the mid-1970s. 
These two pieces of evidence strongly suggest that culture is not an important 
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explanation of why Japan’s household saving rate was high during much of the postwar 
period.   
 
3.2. The Impact of Economic, Demographic, and Institutional Factors 
What then can explain why Japan’s household saving rate has been high during 
much of the postwar period?  My hypothesis is that Japan’s household saving rate was 
high during the 1955-95 period (especially during the 1960s and 1970s) because of 
various temporary economic, demographic, and institutional factors that were applicable 
during this period.  Horioka (1990) lists more than thirty such factors, and Hayashi 
(1986, 1997) and Horioka (1993b, 2006a) are also useful summaries of the literature on 
household saving behavior in Japan.  Here, I examine what I consider to be the eight 
most important explanations of why Japan’s high household saving rate was high during 
the 1955-95 period (especially during the 1960s and 1970s). 
 (1) The High Growth Rate of Income.  The high growth rate of income  
during the high-growth era from the 1950s to the early 1970s undoubtedly helped raise 
Japan’s household saving rate.  When income grows rapidly and/or unexpectedly, 
households often cannot adjust their living standards and consumption patterns at the 
same pace, and as a result, saving (the difference between income and consumption) 
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tends to increase, at least temporarily.   
(2) The Low Level of Household Wealth Holdings.  Household wealth 
holdings were very low in Japan just after the Second World War because the war 
destroyed much of Japan’s housing stock and the postwar hyperinflation reduced the 
real value of financial assets.  Japanese households presumably saved as much as they 
did in part to restore their wealth holdings to desired levels. 
(3) The Unavailability of Consumer Credit.  Consumer credit was not readily 
available in Japan until recently, and thus Japanese households found it necessary to 
save in advance of purchases of such big-ticket items as housing, automobiles, furniture, 
and electrical appliances.  Moreover, the paucity of credit also increased the need for 
precautionary saving because Japanese households knew that they would not be able to 
borrow in times of emergency. 
(4) The Young Age Structure of the Population.  The age structure of Japan’s 
population was one of the youngest among the industrialized countries until recently.  
As Table 2 shows, in 1975, the share of the elderly (those aged 65 or older) in Japan’s 
total population was only 7.9 percent, which was the lowest among the OECD member 
countries at the time (this ratio was 3.6 percent in South Korea in 1975, but South Korea  
was not yet an OECD member country at the time).  According to the life cycle 
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hypothesis, the aggregate household saving rate will be higher in a country with a young 
population because the young typically work and save, whereas the elderly typically 
retire from work and dissave, and thus the young age structure of Japan’s population can 
help explain her high household saving rate in the past (see, for example, Modigliani 
and Brumberg 1955).  Indeed, Horioka (1989) finds that the low ratio of the aged 
population to the working-age population was by far the most important cause of 
Japan’s high private saving rate during the 1975-84 period, and the same undoubtedly 
holds for her household saving rate.   
(Table 2 about here.) 
(5) The Bonus System of Compensation.  Japan’s bonus system of 
compensation, whereby a large chunk of employee compensation is paid in the form of 
semiannual lump-sum bonuses, is often said to have encouraged, or at least facilitated, 
saving (see, for example, Ishikawa and Ueda 1984).  
(6) Tax Breaks for Saving.  The Japanese government introduced many tax 
breaks for saving such as the maruyū system (the tax-exempt system for small savings 
whereby the interest income on bank and postal deposits and on government bonds was 
tax-exempt, up to a limit), and these tax breaks for saving may have induced Japanese 
households to save more than they would have otherwise.  
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(7) The Low Level of Public Pension Benefits.  Public old-age pension 
benefits were relatively low in Japan until 1973.  This made it necessary for Japanese 
households to save on their own to prepare for their life after retirement. 
(8) Saving Promotion Activities.  The Japanese government and the 
quasi-governmental Central Council for Savings Promotion engaged in a variety of 
saving promotion activities such as the preparation and distribution of magazines, 
statistical handbooks, booklets, leaflets, posters, films, household financial ledgers, and 
money boxes, the appointment of private citizens as saving promotion leaders, etc., 
during much of the postwar period, and Garon (1997, Chapter 5) has argued that these 
saving promotion activities helped to raise Japan’s household saving rate. 
 
4. Why Don’t the Japanese Save As Much Now? 
In the previous section, I discussed why Japan’s household saving rate was so 
high in the past, but in this section, I discuss why Japan’s household saving rate has 
shown a downward trend since the mid-1970s.  My thesis is that Japan’s household 
saving rate has declined since the mid-1970s because the factors that caused Japan’s 
household saving rate to be high until the mid-1970s gradually became less applicable 
after the mid-1970s. 
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(1) Double-digit rates of economic growth ended in the early 1970s, and 
income growth rates have been low in recent years, especially in the 1990s. 
(2) The wealth holdings of Japanese households increased rapidly as a result of 
their high saving rates, and by 1990, the ratio of household wealth holdings to 
household disposable income in Japan was by far the highest among the Group of 7 
(G7) countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United States, and the 
United Kingdom) (see Horioka 2006a, Table 5.3).3 
(3) Consumer credit has become more and more available over time, and by 
1990, the ratio of household liabilities outstanding to household disposable income in 
Japan was by far the highest among the G7 countries (see Horioka 2006, Table 5.3). 
(4) Japan’s population is aging at an unprecedented rate, with the share of the 
population aged 65 or older to the total population rising from 7.9 percent (lowest 
among the OECD member countries at the time) in 1975 to 17.2 percent (third place 
among the OECD member countries) in 2000 (see Table 2). 
(5) According to the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (Chingin Kouzou Kihon 
Toukei Chousa), conducted annually by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 
there has been a long-term decline in the ratio of bonus income to regular employee 
compensation since 1975: the ratio of “average annual special cash earnings” to 
 16
“average monthly scheduled cash earnings” showed an upward trend until 1975, 
peaking at 3.92, but has shown a downward trend since then (except for a temporary 
increase during the 1979-92 period when economic conditions were favorable), falling 
to 3.00 by 2005.  
(6) Most tax breaks for saving including the aforementioned maruyū system  
were abolished (except for the elderly) in 1988. 
(7) Public old-age pension benefits were dramatically improved in 1973, and a 
public long-term care insurance program was introduced in 2000 
(8) Government saving promotion activities have been scaled back, and the 
Central Council for Savings Promotion was renamed the Central Council for Savings 
Information in 1987 (and renamed the Central Council for Financial Services 
Information in 2001), gradually shifting from the active encouragement of saving to 
providing consumers with information on the array of financial services available and 
helping them with life planning.  
Moreover, I concluded earlier that culture was not an important determinant of 
Japan’s high household saving rate, but to the extent that it is important, it can help 
explain the decline in Japan’s household saving rate since culture presumably weakens 
over time due to the increasing influx of foreign influences. 
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Thus, virtually all of the factors that caused Japan’s household saving rate to be 
high have weakened over time, and this can explain why Japan’s household saving rate 
has declined so sharply since the mid-1970s. 
 
5. How Much Will the Japanese Save in the Future? 
In this section, I speculate about future trends in Japan’s household saving rate. 
In my opinion, the most important factor determining future trends in Japan’s household 
saving rate will be the rapid aging of her population.  Japan’s population is aging at the 
fastest rate in human history and has already become virtually the most aged in the 
world.  As Table 2 shows, the share of the population aged 65 or older to the total 
population in Japan is projected to increase from 17.2 percent in 2000 to 28.9 percent in 
2025, rising from third to first place among the OECD member countries),  This will 
cause her household saving rate to continue its rapid decline if the life-cycle hypothesis, 
which assumes that the elderly finance their living expenses during retirement by 
drawing down their previously accumulated savings, is valid, and Horioka (1993b, 2002, 
and 2006b) argues that it is.  Indeed, a number of authors, myself included, have 
projected that the rapid aging of Japan’s population will cause Japan’s household saving 
rate to decline to zero or even negative levels by around 2010 (see Horioka 1989, 
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Horioka 1991, and for a useful survey Horioka 1992).  
 I should note, however, that the discussion thus far has focused exclusively on 
the impact of the aging of the population on the household saving rate.  The other 
factors that caused Japan’s household saving rate to be high during most of the postwar 
period will continue weakening, and this will cause Japan’s household saving rate to 
decline even more sharply. 
 For example, the growth rate of income can be expected to recover somewhat 
as the economy recovers but is very unlikely to return to the levels of the high-growth 
period; the level of household wealth holdings can be expected to resume its increase as 
land and equity prices stabilize and/or recover; the ratio of bonus income to regular 
employee compensation shows no signs of recovering; the special tax breaks on capital 
gains on stock sales and dividend income, which were introduced in 2003, are 
scheduled to be abolished shortly; saving promotion activities have already been 
discontinued; and .the impact of culture can be expected to continue weakening due to 
the continued influx of foreign influences. 
The primary exceptions are uncertainty about the future of the public pension 
system and changes in the lending law.  The rapid ageing of the population, combined 
with the pay-as-you-go nature of the public pension system, is causing the finances of 
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the system to deteriorate, which in turn is necessitating cuts in benefits, increases in 
contribution rates, and considerable uncertainty about the future of the system. This is 
likely to cause Japanese households to save more for life during retirement, thereby 
putting upward pressure on Japan’s household saving rate. 
In addition, the lending law was revised in December 2006, and as part of this 
revision, the ceiling on the lending rate for unsecured consumer loans was reduced and 
a limit was imposed on loan amounts. It has been projected that this will cause the 
outstanding loans of consumer finance companies to be halved, and the reduced 
availability of consumer loans may cause households to spend less and save more. 
In my opinion, however, the factors putting downward pressure on Japan’s 
household saving rate far exceed the factors putting upward pressure thereon, and thus 
there is no doubt that Japan’s household saving rate will continue to decline sharply in 
the coming years.  
 
6. Policy Implications 
 In this section, I present the policy implications of my finding that Japan’s 
household saving rate was high during much of the postwar period but that it has been 
falling since the mid-1970s and is projected to continue declining in the future as well. 
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 First, however, I would like to step back and consider the role that saving plays 
in the economy as a whole.  Saving is indispensable in any economy because it 
provides the funds for financing investment in plant and equipment, housing, social 
infrastructure, etc.  Investment cannot be done without a corresponding amount of 
saving from somewhere—either from the same sector, from another sector of the same 
economy, or from abroad.  
 In the case of Japan, the household sector saved at high levels throughout most 
of the postwar period, and this abundant saving of the household sector was used in a 
variety of different ways.  For example, during the high-growth period of the 1950s, 
1960s, and early 1970s, household saving was used primarily to finance corporate 
investment in plant and equipment, and hence was instrumental in increasing the 
productive capacity of the economy and in achieving rapid economic growth.  Since 
the 1970s, however, a considerable share of household saving has been used to finance 
investment in housing and social infrastructure, thereby contributing toward improving 
the quality of life of the Japanese people and toward facilitating economic growth.  
And since the 1980s, a considerable share of household saving has been lent abroad 
(either directly or indirectly via financial intermediaries), thereby helping to alleviate 
saving shortages in the United States and other countries but at the same time leading to 
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enormous capital account deficits that had to be offset by correspondingly large trade 
and current account surpluses.  Thus, Japan’s abundant supply of household saving has 
played an important role throughout the postwar period, but the nature of its role has 
shifted over time. 
 Since the abundant supply of household saving in Japan has played such an 
important role in the past, one might be tempted to conclude that the sharp decline in 
Japan’s household saving rate that began in the mid-1970s and that is projected to 
continue in the future as well will lead to a severe saving shortage, spelling disaster for 
the Japanese economy, if not the world economy.  However, I do not share this view 
for the following reasons. 
 First, even if the household saving rate declines, the overall level of national 
saving in Japan will not decline if there is a corresponding increase in the saving of the 
other sectors of the economy such as the government and corporate sectors.  The 
Japanese government is currently giving top priority to reconstructing its finances 
(reducing its fiscal deficits) by cutting expenditures and raising taxes, and assuming it 
succeeds, government saving will increase.  Moreover, as the economy recovers, the 
profits of corporations will presumably increase, enabling them to retain more earnings, 
which count as corporate saving.  Thus, it is likely that the saving of both the 
 22
government and corporate sectors will increase in the coming years, thereby at least 
partially offsetting the decline in household saving. 
Moreover, even if the overall level of national saving declines because the 
decline in household saving is not fully offset by increases in the saving of other sectors 
of the economy, a saving shortage will not necessarily emerge because investment may 
also decline.  Japan’s population has been declining since 2005, and a declining 
population means that there is less need to increase the productive capacity of the 
economy and hence less need for investment.  And if the decline in investment demand 
is comparable to the decline in saving, no saving shortage will emerge.     .    
 Moreover, even if a saving shortage emerges because the decline in investment 
demand falls short of the decline in saving, this does not necessarily spell disaster either 
because Japan always has the option of borrowing from abroad.  There are currently 
many countries with very high saving rates such as China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
Singapore, and Japan should be able to borrow from these countries. 
 Thus, I conclude that the prolonged decline in Japan’s household saving rate 
does not necessarily spell disaster for the Japanese economy. 
 
7. Conclusions 
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 This paper presented a variety of data on Japan’s household saving rate and 
found that Japan’s high household saving rate was a temporary phenomenon: Japan’s 
household saving rate was high in both absolute and relative terms during the 1955-95 
period (especially during the 1960s and 1970s) but it was not unusually high during the 
prewar and early postwar periods or after 1995.   
 Moreover, this paper found that Japan’s temporarily high household saving rate 
was due not to culture but to temporary economic, demographic, and institutional 
factors such as the high growth rate of income, the low level of household wealth 
holdings, the unavailability of consumer credit, the young age structure of the 
population, the bonus system of compensation, tax breaks for saving, the low level of 
public pension benefits, and saving promotion activities. 
This paper then argued that the decline in Japan’s household saving rate since 
the mid-1970s is due to the weakening of these factors and that Japan’s household 
saving rate can be expected to decline even further as these factors become even less 
applicable and that the rapid aging of Japan’s population has played the most important 
role. 
 Finally, this paper considered the policy implications of my findings and 
concluded that there is nothing to worry about even if Japan’s household saving rate 
 24
falls to zero or even negative levels because the other sectors of the economy will at 
least partly take up the slack, because investment can also be expected to decline, and 
because Japan always has the option of borrowing from abroad. 
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Figure 1: Trends in Japan's Net Household Saving Rate, 1955-2004
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Notes: The line marked “68SNA” shows data based on the 1968 United Nations System 
of National Accounts, whereas the line marked “93SNA” shows data based on the 1993 
United Nations System of National Accounts.  The 68SNA figures show the net 
household saving rate, while the 93SNA figures show the adjusted net household saving 
rate. 
 
Source: Department of National Accounts, Economic and Social Research Institute, 
Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, ed., Annual Report on National Accounts, 2006 
edition (Tokyo: Mediarando Kabushiki Kaisha, 2006), and the 2004 and 2005 editions 
of the same.
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1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Australia 10.8 7 8.5 12 6.7 18 2.8 19 -2.6 22
Austria 10.5 8 13.3 6 10.9 11 8.4 8T 9.5 6T
*Belgium 11.1 6 9.2 11 13.2 5 9.8 5 7.8 10
Canada 15.8 3 13.0 7 9.2 13 4.7 15 -0.2 18
Czech Rep. na na 9.0 14 3.6 16 3.3 16
*Denmark na 1.3 19 0.9 22 -1.3 21T -0.6 21
Finland 3.4 14 3.6 16 4.7 19 -1.3 21T -0.5 20
France 8.9 10 9.3 10 12.7 6 11.4 3 11.6 3
Germany 12.1 5 13.9 4T 11.0 10 9.2 7 10.7 4
Hungary na na 15.6 3 16.0 1 17.7 1
Ireland na 6.1 13 8.5 16 9.6 6 10.9 5
Italy 21.5 1 23.8 1 17.7 1 8.4 8T 9.5 6T
Japan 16.5 2 13.9 4T 11.9 7 8.3 10 2.4 17
South Korea 14.8 4 22.5 2 17.5 2 10.7 4 4.3 14
Netherlands 5.6 13 17.7 3 14.6 4 7.0 12T 5.7 13
New Zealand 1.3 16 0.7 20 -3.8 23 -4.1 23 -7.1 23
Norway -3.3 17 2.2 18 4.6 20T 5.2 14 11.8 2
*Portugal na na 10.1 12 7.0 12T 6.9 12
*Spain 7.8 11 9.8 8 11.5 9 7.8 11 7.3 11
Sweden 2.2 15 3.2 17 9.1 15 3.2 18 7.9 9
Switzerland na 9.6 9 11.6 8 11.8 2 8.8 8
*United Kingdom 6.9 12 5.6 15 7.0 17 3.5 17 3.5 15
United States 9.2 9 7.0 14 4.6 20T 2.3 20 -0.4 19
OECD Mean 9.1 9.7 9.5 6.3 5.6
Table 1: Net Household Saving Rates of Selected OECD Countries, 1985-2005
Notes: The left-hand figures denote the household saving rate, defined as household saving as
a ratio of disposable household income, while the right-hand figures denote the rank of each
country.  "na" denotes "not available," while "T" denotes "tie."  The first figure for New
Zealand is the figure for 1986 because the figure for 1985 was not available.  The figures
include the saving of households as well as that of non-profit institutions except in the case of
the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Japan, and New Zealand.  For countries marked by an
asterisk, only figures on gross household saving rates were available, and the gross figures
were converted to a net basis by using a conversion factor of 0.7 (which is the approximate
ratio of the average net household saving rate to the average gross household saving rate for
the countries and years used in the present analysis).  In the case of Italy and Sweden, the
figures for 1985 were computed from figures on the gross household saving rate.
Source: For 1985 data, OECD Economic Outlook , vol. 2003/1, no. 73 (June 2003), Annex
Table 24; for 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005 data, the same source, vol. 2006/1, no. 79 (June
2006), Annex Table 23 (in the case of Hungary and New Zealand, the same source, vol.
2004/2, no. 76 (Dec. 2004), and in the case of Ireland, the same source, vol. 2005/2, no. 78
(Dec. 2005), Annex Table 23).
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Country
Australia 8.7 19T 12.3 19T 18.6 19
Austria 14.9 2 15.6 10T 24.3 7
Belgium 13.9 5 17.0 4T 23.7 8
Canada 8.5 21 12.6 18 20.7 17T
Czech Rep. 12.9 9 13.8 16 23.1 10
Denmark 13.4 8 15.0 13 22.5 11
Finland 10.6 15 14.9 14 25.2 5
France 13.5 7 16.0 7T 22.2 12
Germany 14.8 3 16.4 6 24.6 6
Hungary 12.6 10T 14.6 15 21.2 16
Ireland 11.0 13 11.3 22 16.3 23
Italy 12.0 12 18.1 1 25.7 3
Japan 7.9 22 17.2 3 28.9 1
South Korea 3.6 23 7.1 23 16.9 22
Netherlands 10.8 14 13.6 17 21.9 13T
New Zealand 8.7 19T 11.7 21 18.5 20T
Norway 13.7 6 15.4 12 21.8 15
Portugal 9.9 18 15.6 10T 20.7 17T
Spain 10.0 17 17.0 4T 23.6 9
Sweden 15.1 1 17.4 2 25.4 4
Switzerland 12.6 10T 16.0 7T 27.1 2
United Kingdom 14.0 4 15.8 9 21.9 13T
United States 10.5 16 12.3 19T 18.5 20T
OECD Mean 12.6 16.0 24.4
Table 2: Share of the Aged Population in Selected OECD Countries, 1975-2025
Notes: The left-hand figures denote the share of the population aged 65 or older to the
total population, while the right-hand figures denote the rank of each country.  "na"
denotes "not available," while "T" denotes "tie."
Source: United Nations, World Population Ageing, 1950-2050 (New York: United
Nations, 2002).
1975 2000 2025
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SNA68
1990 Benchmark
Revision
1995 Benchmark
Revision
2000 Benchmark
Revision
1955 11.9
1956 12.9
1957 12.6
1958 12.3
1959 13.7
1960 14.5
1961 15.9
1962 15.6
1963 14.9
1964 15.4
1965 15.8
1966 15.0
1967 14.1
1968 16.9
1969 17.1
1970 17.7
1971 17.8
1972 18.2
1973 20.4
1974 23.2
1975 22.8
1976 23.2
1977 21.8
1978 20.8
1979 18.2
1980 17.9 15.4
1981 18.4 16.2
1982 16.7 14.9
1983 16.1 14.3
1984 15.8 14.3
1985 15.6 13.7
1986 15.6 13.0
1987 13.8 11.5
1988 13.0 11.9
1989 12.9 12.0
1990 12.1 12.3
1991 13.2 13.3
1992 13.1 12.5
1993 13.4 12.0
1994 13.3 11.1
1995 13.7 10.4
1996 13.4 8.5 9.2
1997 12.6 8.6 9.0
1998 13.4 9.6 10.1
1999 9.2 8.9
2000 8.2 7.1
2001 5.7 4.3
2002 6.1 4.0
2003 6.3 3.3
2004 2.6
Source: Department of National Accounts, Economic and Social Research
Institute, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, ed., Annual Report on National
Accounts, 2006 edition (Tokyo: Mediarando Kabushiki Kaisha, 2006), and the
2004 and 2005 editions of the same.
Notes: SNA68 denotes the 1968 United Nations System of National Accounts,
while SNA93 denotes the 1993 United Nations System of National Accounts.  The
SNA68 figures show the net household saving rate, while the SNA93 figures show
the adjusted net household saving rate.
SNA93
Table A-1: Trends in Japan's Net Household Saving Rate, 1955-2004
Calendar Year
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Endnotes 
 
                                                  
1 However, Japan’s household saving rate was high (in excess of 15 percent) during the 
1935-37 period according to the former System of National Accounts. 
2 A detailed discussion of the conceptual differences between the 1968 SNA and the 
1993 SNA is beyond the scope of this paper, but the main difference between the two 
lies in their treatment of bad loans.  Under the 1968 SNA, write-offs of bad loans to 
households and unincorporated businesses are treated as a current transfer from 
financial institutions to households.  Thus, bad loan write-offs increase the incomes of 
households, and because their consumption does not change, their measured saving 
increases.  By contact, 1993 SNA treats write-offs of bad loans to households and 
unincorporated businesses as a decline in the asset holdings of financial institutions, and 
thus they do not affect the saving rate of households. 
3 The sharp decline in land and equity prices during the 1990s led to a temporary 
reversal in the increase in the level of household wealth holdings, but both land and 
equity prices seem to have bottomed out.  
